Making servants of masters
In "The New Aristocracy" (RN ?) I described the evolution of
a modern international elite and the general reasons why
elites are so successful in preserving their privileged
position. My purpose here is to examine how the natural and
probably ineradicable tendencies of political elites to
behave abusively and selfishly towards the mass of men may
be moderated by institutional and constitutional means. My
remarks are directed at the British political system, but
have a broad degree of general application.
In resisting the abuse of the many by the few, Britain begins
with the great advantages of a parliamentary system with MPs
elected by the first-past-the-post method and an, in
practice, non-executive head of state chosen by a means
outside any political manipulation short of outright
criminality such as murder. These advantages provide a
massive barricade against a Prime Minister who would be a
despot. He cannot act without the support of an elected
parliamentary majority. His cabinet in practice must be
overwhelmingly drawn from elected politicians. He may change
his cabinet, but he cannot do so without regard to a cabinet
member's status and popularity within the party on whose
support he depends.
Most importantly, the prime minister cannot become head of
state. The mere existence of the office of president, be it
executive or ceremonial, provides the greatest opportunity
to subvert parliamentary control of the executive. The
example of France in the early years of the Fifth Republic
demonstrates how easily a President's powers may be extended
by the overtly democratic means of a referendum against the
wishes of a Parliament.
That is the strength of our political circumstances. But it
is still anything but democratic. If our parliamentary
system by its very nature makes outright dictatorship
improbable, it remorselessly promotes oligarchy, and that
is the poison - the power of the few over the many - which
must be drawn if democratic control is to mean anything.
The means by which we may democratise our politics are
threefold. The first is by the restriction of the powers of
politicians; the second by ensuring that the ordinary elector
has meaningful access to the political process and the third
by the removal of barriers to the use of public instruments
such as the law.
The present great engine of British oligarchy is the power of
the executive in Parliament. How may it be restrained? By
the abolition of the Royal Prerogative which allows a
government to do much outside the remit of parliament,
including the vitally important power to sign treaties. By
the abolition of the whips. By placing the selection of
candidates for any party solely in the hands of the
constituency associations. By insisting that no one may stand
for a Parliamentary seat until they have ten years
experience in work unrelated to politics - this would kill
the modern career politician. By greatly restricting the
number of government post holders, including outlawing the
use of unpaid Parliamentary Private Secretaries - I suggest a
government of twenty four comprised of twelve ministers and
twelve deputy ministers and no others. By removing all
powers of patronage from the government and particularly from
the PM. By giving greater powers of scrutiny to politicians
outside the government. By removing barriers to standing in
parliamentary elections such as the deposit - this would
greatly assist minority and new parties to compete.
If those changes were made, how might our parliament work?
The cabinet could be elected by a Commons vote from
candidates for each ministerial position. Nominations could
be made by any MP. The successful ministerial candidates
would be subject to dismissal by a simple majority vote of
"no confidence". This latter proposal would not change the
present position in theory. However, the absence of whipping
and general party control would make it a much more potent
threat. Any member of the Commons could be allowed to propose
legislation with an equal chance of getting it onto the
statute book. The cabinet could propose a scheme of
legislation as it does now, but its acceptance would be
meaningfully dependent on its majority acceptance by the
entire membership of the Commons.
Such a system would not destroy the power of party, nor make
government impracticable. Parties would still be able to have
a party policy. Party election manifestoes could be still be
published. The executive could still propose legislation.
Moreover, the natural sense of common purpose that a party
engenders would ensure that most of the legislation proposed
by a government would be passed. What such constitutional
reforms would do is restore a more equal balance between the
executive and the backbencher, between party and the
individual MP and diminish the Prime Minister's role. The
actual day-to-day operation of Parliament throughout much
of the period of Britain's greatest power and influence, the
nineteenth century, had much in common.
What of the Lords? A second chamber by its very nature
becomes part of the oligarchic control of politics. If the
second chamber is too strong, it has much the same effect as
a hung parliament or a political system with a structural
separation of powers such as America. If it is too weak, it
provides no meaningful safeguard against abuse by the chamber
with power, but muddies the democratic waters. Where the
second chamber is unelected and its workings are largely
conducted by the placemen of successive governments, as is
the Lords, it is purely a creature of the elite. For those
reasons I favour a single chamber parliament.
A single chamber parliament requires legally enforceable
constitutional constraints on the executive and legislature
to prevent abuses of power. These constraints need to be
protected by a codified constitution which can only be
changed by a large majority of the electorate and which is
adjudicated by an authority independent of Parliament. For
that independent authority I suggest a jury of citizens - say
1000 - selected by lot. Why not a supreme court of legally
qualified judges? Constitutional rights are political not
legal matters. One only has to see how far the American
Constitution has been corrupted by politically motivated
judges to see the danger of a small number of people drawn
from the elite making the decisions. The size of my proposed
jury would remove obvious bias, prevent effective horse
trading amongst the jury and make unimportant the presence of
people on the jury who were incompetent to make decisions
through a lack of education and intellect or through a lack
of interest in serving.
The constitution should be designed to perform three tasks.
First, to give legal rights which will both strengthen the
democratic process and protect the citizen, for example a
right to free expression. Second, to diminish the
opportunities for politicians to subvert the democratic
process, for instance a clause stating that no treaty may be
entered into which extends beyond the lifetime of a
parliament. Third, the enshrinement of the form of our
political system, for example a clause making
first-past-the-post the method of electing Parliament.
The duties of an MP need to be defined in law. The MP is at
present under no enforceable obligations to his constituents.
The Burkean idea of the MP as a representative independent of
his constituents was designed for an aristocratic age by
Burke who was a particularly assiduous toady of the
nobility. If the ordinary elector is to have any meaningful
representation the MP must become a mixture of delegate and
advocate. I would favour a system which gave electors the
power to recall their MP.
The position of the ordinary citizen may be further
strengthened by referenda. However, referenda should only be
initiated by the electorate, never the politicians for they
will inevitably only call referenda when they believe that
they can be won. The rules for referenda must also be strict
to ensure a lack of bias in the public presentation of
arguments.
Secrecy is the cloak of oligarchies, openness the backcloth
of democracy. Democracy by definition requires the
electorate to know what is being done on their behalf by
elected representatives and public servants. With very few
exceptions, such as some military data, information in the
public sphere could be made available to the electorate
without compromising the interests of the country.
Secrecy allows governments, their non-elected agents and
public servants to subvert democracy. In particular it allows
agreements to be made secretly which range from the
straightforwardly immoral to the damagingly mistaken. In
particular, secrecy allows the promotion of the beliefs and
interests of the those with political power.
Of all the instruments to restrain the abuse of power, the
law stands highest. If any citizen can challenge the abuse of
power by the state in open court, confident that the
administration of justice is not tainted by political
interference, that is the most massive and immediate bulwark
against oppression that a society can have.
The English legal system is as fair as any in the world. It
has an ancient unbroken tradition, well established
principles of due process, the long accepted principle of
equality before the law, widespread use of the jury and
provision for legal aid. Yet English law falls well short
of justice. The most obvious shortfall is the fact that the
quality of legal advice a man receives is largely determined
by his wallet. In civil suits the size of his wallet
determines whether he may even go to court. To ensure true
equality before the law, money must be removed from the
equation. This can only be done by the state funding all
legal work. Lawyers should still work for fees and be treated
as self-employed, but the amount they earn for any given work
should be determined by Parliament.
Our legal system also has too great a political involvement.
The Lord Chancellor in effect appoints all judges, the
attorney general my both initiate and end prosecutions. The
solicitor general acts as the attorney general's deputy. All
three appointments are in the gift of the PM and all three
appointees belong to the party led by the PM. Political
involvement in the law should be restricted to the passing of
laws, the funding of the legal system, and the acting as a
court of last resort for complaints of maladministration of
justice brought by the public. All judicial appointments
should be made by lot from those with sufficient legal
experience.
Outside the formal institutions of the state lie the mass
media. The mass media are part of the democratic process. At
present the British media is effectively closed to the
ordinary citizen. Overwhelmingly, appointment to media posts
is not by merit but by influence. It is not that all
mediafolk are incompetent, merely that they do not get their
posts by open competition. A statutory right of reply would
be a good start to opening up access to the media, but means
must also be found to broaden the base from which mediafolk
are chosen. Outlawing nepotism would be one.
Realism says that institutional and constitutional reforms
will not remove the oligarchic tendency in human beings or
the propensity of elites to manipulate and abuse the
majority. But we have the evidence of the past two centuries
that the tendency can be ameliorated and controlled to the
extent that it is kept within such limits that allow the
masses a reasonable degree of freedom, material comfort and
physical security. However, that can only be achieved within
a clearly defined political and cultural setting, the most
efficient of which is the nation state.
Outside the nation state there is a malign ghost at the
democratic feast: supranationalism. This is inimical to
democracy because it allows elites to dilute democratic
involvement to the point of nullity. If, for example,
Britain remains within the EU, it will not matter what
constitutional and institutional safeguards are introduced
into the British political system, because they would not
have supremacy over EU law and executive decisions, both of
which are made by an hermetically sealed elite whose values
are profoundly antidemocratic.
Globally, the supranationalist threat comes from American
quasi imperialism, the UN and its agencies, particularly
the IMF and the World bank, treaties such as that which
commit Britain to the dictates of the Court of Human Rights
and above all from indiscriminate free trade which is the
greatest engine for dissolving the nation state the
internationalist ever discovered. To be democratic, Britain
must recover control over her affairs.
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